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Abstract
In this paper, we present a new reference dataset simulating
digital evidence for image steganography. Steganography detec-
tion is a digital image forensic topic that is relatively unknown
in practical forensics, although stego app use in the wild is on
the rise. This paper introduces the first database consisting of
mobile phone photographs and stego images produced from mo-
bile stego apps, including a rich set of side information, offering
simulated digital evidence. StegoAppDB, a steganography apps
forensics image database, contains over 810,000 innocent and
stego images using a minimum of 10 different phone models from
24 distinct devices, with detailed provenanced data comprising
a wide range of ISO and exposure settings, EXIF data, message
information, embedding rates, etc. We develop a camera app,
Cameraw, specifically for data acquisition, with multiple images
per scene, saving simultaneously in both DNG and high-quality
JPEG formats. Stego images are created from these original im-
ages using selected mobile stego apps through a careful process
of reverse engineering. StegoAppDB contains cover-stego image
pairs including for apps that resize the stego dimensions. We re-
tain the original devices and continue to enlarge the database,
and encourage the image forensics community to use StegoAp-
pDB. While designed for steganography, we discuss uses of this
publicly available database to other digital image forensic topics.
Introduction
Creating effective tools for forensic practitioners requires
that developers have access to standardized sets of data, as rec-
ognized by the National Academy of Sciences National Research
Council and others (2009). As forensic processing of digital pho-
tographs becomes an increasingly important part of criminal in-
vestigations, the young field of digital image forensics must cul-
tivate carefully designed and populated datasets. One area of dig-
ital image forensics is steganalysis, the analysis of a photograph
for hidden content. Image steganography is the process to hide a
message or payload in an innocent image, producing a stego im-
age. See Woodford (2018) or Kessler (2015) for an introduction
to steganography.
Stego apps on mobile devices are popular, easy to use, and
stealthy. Table 1 displays the number of installs for 6 of over 100
apps that are available today. Development of techniques to dis-
cover steganography content where the image is ”in the wild,” that
is, representative of what a practitioner may see while investigat-
ing a forensic case, is quite different from detection of a stego
image in a controlled academic setting. We use “in the wild” to
describe unconstrained scenarios, involving many apps, many dif-
ferent source devices, and unknown processing to images such as
photo editing. Access to simulated digital evidence images can
permit benchmark of current steg detection software and advance
improved solutions, as well as introduce academic researchers to
unanticipated questions. Until StegoAppDB, no current image
database provided data that is reflective of that found in mobile
stego cases.
Table 1: Real-world stego apps used for cover-stego image gener-
ation.
App Name Platform # Installs EmbeddingDomain
Open
Source
PixelKnot Android 100,000+ JPEG Yes
Steganography M Android 10,000+ Spatial No
Pocket Stego Android 1,000+ Spatial No
MobiStego Android 1,000+ Spatial Yes
Passlok Privacy Android 1,000+ JPEG Yes
Pictograph iOS - Spatial Yes
While image datasets have been used successfully for bench-
marking academic steganalysis algorithms Bas et al. (2011), Gloe
and Bo¨hme (2010), Dang-Nguyen et al. (2015), we identify some
drawbacks for their use in benchmarking steganalysis tools on
data closer to “in the wild” as encountered by forensic practi-
tioners. For example, the commercial software StegoHunt Wet-
Stone Technologies (2017) advertises capabilities to analyze im-
age data. However, we know of no publicly available datasets
containing stego images on which to benchmark performance er-
rors. Further, as the use of stego apps on mobile devices be-
comes more prevalent, large datasets containing examples of im-
ages from these sources will provide benchmarking capabilities
for current and future software, allowing more realistic detection
of steganography “in the wild.” Thus, creation of datasets that ad-
dresses some of these shortcomings is a welcome addition to the
forensic community. Tellingly, the prevalence of steganography
use occuring in forensic settings is unknown: there is no existing
software designed for steg detection on suspect imags from a mo-
bile device, nor any studies published detailing the population use
rate of steganography, to the authors’ knowledge.
If a forensic practitioner would like to test unknown images
for steganograpy, she appears to have limited choices. First, three
off-the-shelf software packages−StegoHunt WetStone Technolo-
gies (2017), DC3 StegDetect DC3 (2017) and Provos’ StegDe-
tect Provos and Honeyman (2002)−cannot detect, with any relia-
bility, stego images produced with recent stego algorithms Chen
et al. (2018b). Second, if a forensic image analyst would like to
develop or benchmark any new steg detection software beyond
what these are designed to detect, there are no publicly available
datasets (at least known to us). Other steg detection approaches
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can be used, such as searching for evidence of auxiliary instal-
lation files on the computer Zax and Adelstein (2009), which is
proposed as field triage.
We observe that when faced with a similar situation, the face
recognition community turned to unconstrained datasets that chal-
lenged solutions beyond constrained datasets, such as drivers li-
censes Phillips et al. (2010), Best-Rowden et al. (2014). In a sim-
ilar manner, by using data sets that foster detection challenges
with “in the wild” image data, the steganalysis community can
pursue questions that are applicable to real-life scenarios, such as
the transfer-learning problem of cover-source mismatch Ker et al.
(2013).
Motivated by this challenge, we propose that a database sat-
isfy the following criteria for developing and benchmarking solu-
tions to practical steg detection.
1. Authentication. Each image is provided with pedigree of
origin, including camera device, meta data (including EXIF
data), acquisition app, etc.
2. Representation. The data includes representatives of prac-
tical scenarios encountered in crime cases.
3. Evaluation. The data is effective for evaluating and bench-
marking standard algorithms including commercial soft-
ware and academic algorithms, and allows reliable, repro-
ducible, and measurable results that may be used in a court
of law.
4. Public access and free of copyright or privacy issues.
Communities require low-cost or free access to a standard
data set without encountering copyright or privacy issues.
A review of several popular data sets used in digital image
forensics research finds they have varying degrees of agreement
with the four criteria, revealing a need for such data. Our goal
is to provide an image database suitable to researchers in both
crime lab and academic settings, allowing for performance eval-
uation on both academic steganalysis algorithms and commercial
steganalysis software. Data in the database should allow simula-
tion of ”in the wild” digital evidence, as well as data appropriate
for academic researchers to pursue problems related to real data
created from real-world mobile stego apps. Should steganogra-
phy evidence achieve the penultimate goal of being presented in
a court case, performance evaluation on a standardized data set is
in line with Daubert’s requirement that scientific expert testimony
be assessed for its evidentiary reliability Stern (2017).
In this paper we introduce a publicly available data set that
agrees with much of 1-4 above. The database consists solely of
images from mobile phones and mobile stego apps, representing
data that certainly forensic practitioners see with increasing fre-
quency. With over 800,000 stego and non-stego images created
from stego apps on mobile phones, the data is offered in several
file formats and with a wide variety of: scenes, exposure settings,
embedding algorithms (software apps), embedding rates, devices
(24) and models (10). A user-friendly web page provides detailed
information on the content of the database and how to query and
download. The data in StegoAppDB has extensive relational in-
formation for each data item. We continue to add to the database,
and we invite suggestions to improve the contents or access. We
anticipate access to a database with such varied and richly notated
corpora will provide opportunities for motivated developers and
researchers to create more practical solutions for steganography
detection, and perhaps be useful for other digital image forensic
purposes.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. In “Re-
lated Works,” we review popular data sets and current software
for steg detection. In “Creation of the Database,” we discuss the
acquisition procedure for original images and the generation of
stego and other images for the database. In “Descriptive Statistics,
Substantiation and Evaluation,” we give descriptive statistics and
provide results of several experiments to substantiate our claims
of the database′s investigatory nature. The section “User Interface
to Query for Data” describes how the database can be queried. We
conclude with remarks for forensic scientists from academic and
practicing communities, including potential uses of our database
in other areas of digital image forensics.
Related Works
While both academics and practitioners pursue forensic anal-
ysis of digital images, the two communities have very different
goals. Academics seek innovative methods that advance the state-
of-the-art in focused areas of conceptual performance; for ste-
ganalyisis, this can mean improving detection error, or introduc-
ing a new framework to improve performance, such as the re-
lationship of embedding changes to syndrome coding Crandall
(1998). At the other end of the spectrum, forensic practitioners
expect their results to be interpreted in context of legal matters,
and require outcomes that are validated by well-established and
reproducible scientific procedures supporting quantitative anal-
ysis of uncertainty. Since our objective is to provide a set of
data suitable to both communities, this section discusses issues
from each community, including datasets, software and algo-
rithms used to develop and benchmark steg detection. Datasets
used in the development of algorithms or software can, of course,
influence the performance of the software.
One typical job of an academic steganalyst is to create a new
embedding algorithm (examples are WOW Holub and Fridrich
(2012) or J-UNIWARD Holub et al. (2014)), and then test its se-
curity (ability to be detected) using steganalysis techniques. Test-
ing unknown images for hidden content with no prior informa-
tion occurs only in stego challenges, the last of which completed
in 2010 Bas et al. (2011), and another which is currently ongo-
ing. As a standard practice, academic steganalyzers use a set of
innocent images and create their own stego images using their
code, and, for example, data from BOSSbase Bas et al. (2010),
and more recently, for data-hungry convolutional neural networks,
the BOWS-2 data set. It is well-known that the peculiarities of a
data set combined with features and machine learning classifier
influences detection performance, e.g., see Sedighi et al. (2016),
where the authors verify different security performances based on
compression or downsampling rates of RAW cover sources.
While other image forensics are not the focus of our work,
we note that two data sets created explicitly for image forensics
- the popular and publicly available data set for forgery detec-
tion RAISE Dang-Nguyen et al. (2015) and the excellent Dresden
database for camera identification Gloe and Bo¨hme (2010) - have
been used by researchers for steganalysis experiments. They are
included below in our comparison with the four criteria. For de-
scriptions of additional data sets, we refer the reader to the exten-
sive review in Dang-Nguyen et al. (2015).
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1. BOSSbase Bas et al. (2011) was created for an academic
steganalysis competition in 2010 and by hindsight, intro-
duced a clear example of the cover-source mismatch prob-
lem Bo¨hme (2009). BOSSbase has been used successfully
to evaluate the performance of hundreds of academic ste-
ganalysis algorithms. It contains 10,000 RAW images from
7 different still camera devices. However, it was not de-
signed to benchmark commercial programs. The images
have EXIF data, whose authentication, copyright and pri-
vacy statuses are unknown. The scenes reflect real-life sce-
narios, are collected in auto-exposure settings or half-auto
settings, with the intent to produce high visual-quality im-
ages; thus, exposure settings do not cover more extreme
lighting conditions.
2. The RAISE database contains 8156 RAW images, con-
structed primarily for forgery detection Dang-Nguyen et al.
(2015), in auto-exposure modes from three different still
cameras over a period of several years. RAISE does not con-
tain any JPEG images. It provides a challenging real-world
data set They are authenticated, and the scene content re-
flects real-life scenarios. They are copyright-free, and most
likely do not have privacy issues.
3. The Dresden Image Database Gloe and Bo¨hme (2010) was
also created for the forensic community, with the main pur-
pose for camera identification. It has almost 17,000 images,
mostly in high-quality JPEG, from 73 still cameras devices
representing 25 distinct models, with many different camera
settings. However, the scene content is limited to a rela-
tively small number of different scenes in order to replicate
same scene/different camera scenarios for intense camera-
specific forensic processing. Thus, it does not provide the
wide range of scene content required for reliable stego de-
tection. The data are authenticated and many images reflect
real-life scenarios. They are copyright-free, and are taken
with auto-exposure settings.
Both RAISE and Dresden image data sets were not designed
with steganography in mind, and so they lack stego images, nat-
urally. Thus, their data cannot be used directly for evaluation of
commercial steg detection software. While undoubtedly stego im-
ages could be produced and made available, currently this has not
been done.
From an analysis of existing data sets and our requirements
for creating a database to meet much of the four criteria, we pro-
pose our plan. The challenges were to meet as much of the four
forensic criteria as possible, and generate hundreds of thousands
of images. Our data set consists of images produced from mobile
phones and mobile apps, and retains provenanced side informa-
tion for all images. The data is copyright-free and has no privacy
issues, and is free and open to the public. To generate the images,
we created a fast and efficient method using program analysis and
reverse engineering. Each app has unique characteristics and re-
quired individual inspection using apk tools to generate the inter-
mediate images and specific embedding rates. With these prob-
lems solved, StegoAppDB was populated. It is available online
at https://forensicstats.org/stegoappdb/ Center for Statistics and
Applications in Forensics (2018) and we encourage the forensic
community to access, download and use the data, and contact us
with any suggestions.
Creation of the Database
To populate our database, we use the four criteria as a guide-
line to develop appropriate data acquisition methods, data source
choices, and auxiliary data authentication information. Our pro-
cedure was designed to collect a large amount of image data, to
represent a reasonable number of different mobile phone cam-
eras, and to include stego images from apps that are native to
mobile devices. During the initial phase of data collection, we
observed the well-known phenomenon that exposure settings of
the images−related to image noise−impact the error rates of ste-
ganalysis algorithms Lin et al. (2018a), Lin et al. (2018b). There-
fore, to make the image data representative, we collect the original
photos with large diversities in exposure settings, which includes
both ISO value and exposure time. To acquire such large amounts
of photos from the phone’s camera, we created our own research
camera app that allows the photographer to collect 20 images au-
tomatically. Then, in order to create the large number of stego
images from the stego apps on the phone, we reverse engineered
each app individually using manual methods so that we could run
the stego app directly on the phone that was cabled to the com-
puter. This allowed us to produce stego images on the phone much
faster than was possible by entering the same information on the
app on the phone by a human. This section describes the process
by which we create images that are put into our database.
Collecting Original Images using Cameraw
Exploiting the comprehensive range of features available for
camera APIs on Android and iOS platforms, we create a cam-
era app called “Cameraw” to capture images on our lab’s smart-
phones Chen (2017). Our main goal with Cameraw is to create a
standardized process for the image acquisition procedure so that
the app is simple to use, takes large amounts of photos quickly
at acceptable visual fidelity but with varied exposure settings, and
reduces the number of screen touches. By the press of one button,
Cameraw automatically captures 20 images of one scene. After
the “capture” button is pressed, the following steps ensue:
1. The auto focus and auto exposure pre-capture sequence is
triggered.
2. After a short time, the focus is locked and exposure settings
converge.
3. Two auto exposure (AE) images are captured, one JPEG and
one DNG, and 9 manual exposure settings are calculated
using the AE values.
4. The camera switches to manual exposure mode, and cap-
tures 9 pairs (one JPEG and one DNG) of additional images
at the 9 manual settings, for a total of 20 images with 10
different exposure settings, within 15 seconds.
Although the Android and iOS camera libraries provide auto
exposure bracketing functionalities, we choose not to use them
because they do not provide a wide enough range of ISO and ex-
posure time values. Instead, we implement a customized brack-
eting method using the auto ISO and exposure time values that
retain fairly good fidelity image quality. Let i be the auto ISO,
and let e be the auto exposure time. We calculate 3 ISO values:
0.5∗ i, 1.75∗ i, 3.0∗ i, and 3 exposure time values: 2.0∗e, 1.25∗e,
0.5∗e. From these values, we generate 9 distinct pairs of ISO and
exposure time settings for capture in “manual” mode of the cam-
era API. The other camera parameters are chosen by the built-in
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camera firmware. We lock all camera parameters during capture
(except ISO and exposure time), to ensure all 20 photos have the
same capture settings.
Cameraw is implemented with the camera2 API Android
Developers (2018) in Android, and the AVFoundation frame-
work Apple Inc. (2018) in iOS. We installed Cameraw on all de-
vices, 10 Android phones and 14 iPhones. Several photographers
were hired to capture a minimum of 100 indoor scenes using each
device, resulting in total of 2412 scenes and 48,240 original im-
ages. We use the term “original” to describe those images that
are captured using Cameraw on the mobile devices, with no fur-
ther processing applied, including cropping. Our database con-
tains other types of images that are created by processing meth-
ods, which we discuss in the next section.
Generating Cover-Stego Images
To facilitate benchmarking capabilities for steg detection of
stego images generated from mobile stego apps, the database pro-
vides a large selection of app-generated stego images. We dis-
covered that some apps embed a distinctive ”signature” into the
image, while others do not. We provide stego images for both
types of apps.
We select six apps and create a coding environment on a
computer, using a mobile phone connected to the computer, and
batch-produce stego images with very specific embedding rates
much quicker than possible by hand on the device. This process
allowed us to save intermediate images where needed, specifically
“cover” images. A cover image can be viewed as a 0% embed-
ded stego image, that is, a cover image is the image just prior
to embedding and having the same pixel dimensions as the stego
image. For many stego apps we observed, the image input to the
app through the GUI user interface may undergo image resizing,
among other alterations. Since academic steganalysis algorithms
require cover-stego image pairs of the same dimension, machine
learning classifiers in the traditional sense cannot be constructed
from “original” image-stego image pairs as used by mobile stego
apps. See Fig. 1, where the data flow for a generic mobile stego
app is displayed on the left hand side. From the GUI of the stego
app, the user inputs the payload, or message, as well as an input
image, typically from the gallery or using the camera. The user
may also enter a password as well. These data are passed to the
internal code of the app, and any image processing such as resiz-
ing, or additional image creation, such as a cover image, can be
obtained only through program analysis. Since the cover image
is not known, feature extraction and subsequent machine learning
development cannot be completed, as displayed on the right-hand
side of Fig. 1.
Cover images are a currently a necessity for machine learn-
ing algorithm development. This is not the case for certain stego
apps that add an app-specific signature in the stego image that can
be detected using other means. We next describe the process to
generate cover and stego images for all apps.
Stego Apps.
To generate cover and stego images, we select six real-world
stego apps: five Google Play Store apps and one Apple App Store
app. See Table 1. In the column “Embedding Domain,” we see
that two apps embed payload in JPEG domain while the remain-
ing embed in the spatial domain. The “Open Source” column
Figure 1: Data and processing flow in a generic mobile stego app (left-
hand side). On the right-hand side are steps to create a machine classifier,
which cannot be completed for a stego app image due to unknown cover
image.
indicates that source code for two apps is not publicly available.
Inaccessible source code increases the difficulty of studying the
apps’ embedding process. For these two apps, we use reverse
engineering tools to analyze the binary code and to delineate the
steps that generate a stego image. We refer the interested reader to
Chen et al. (2018c) for case studies of reverse engineering applied
specifically to mobile stego apps.
We define the images in our database in the following way:
An original image is the image acquired by the mobile phone
camera. An original image is used in many ways, such as an in-
put image to a mobile stego app; or pieces are cropped to produce
smaller-sized images to be used as cover images to embedding al-
gorithms. A cover image is the image that is paired to the stego
image used for machine learning classifiers. A cover image has
the same pixel dimensions (width x height) as the corresponding
stego image, and can be viewed as a 0% stego image. We define
an input image to be the image that is selected by the user on the
GUI of the stego app (on the phone), usually from the phone’s
gallery or by using the phone’s camera. In academic steganaly-
sis algorithms that use cover-stego image pairs, the input image
as defined here is identical image to the cover image. In mobile
stego apps, the input image is the photo selected by the user and
subsequently processed by the app developer to create the final
stego image. This input image can differ from the cover image
due to pre-processing or resizing by the app prior to embedding.
Batch Image Generation.
By manual code analysis of the apps, we determine how the
embedding path is selected, which embedding method was used,
pre-processing of input images and messages, etc. With knowl-
edge of the data modification and processing steps, we create a
script to batch generate cover−stego image pairs. Using source
code modification and binary code instrumentation, we add two
necessary functions to get complete side information for each
stego image generated from a stego app:
1. We save the intermediate cover image (see Fig. 1). This
ensures that the database contains the corresponding cover
image for each stego image, and is a critical step for stego
apps that resize the input images prior to embedding.
2. We generate stego images with specific embedding rates.
This is achieved by analyzing the stego app’s embedding
procedure, including how the payload is processed. To gen-
erate a stego image with a specific embedding rate, the mod-
ified app first calculates the cover image capacity and then
calculates the necessary length of the embedded payload to
achieve that rate. We correct for additional length added for
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auxiliary information.
As machine learning steganalysis classifiers prefer smaller
images due to computational constraints, we process the original
DNG and JPEG images to create (symmetrically) center-cropped
grayscale PNG images (512x512). We use the term “cropped” to
label these innocent PNG images. The PNG images are used as
input images to the four spatial domain embedding apps to gener-
ate stego images. For the two frequency domain embedding apps,
original-sized images are used as input images. Both DNG and
JPEG images are used to generate PixelKnot stegos, while only
JPEG images are used to generate Passlok stego images due to
Passlok’s inability to accept DNG files. All information is stored
in the database for each stego image. We remark that all other
variable being the same, the type of image used, DNG or JPEG,
can affect the steg detection error rate Sedighi et al. (2016). The
set of 10 JPEG and 10 DNG images from one scene (20 total
images) differ only in file format and allow for experiments that
involve compressed versus raw data comparisons.
The input messages embedded into the stego images are ac-
tual text messages selected from a set of dictionaries containing
634 Shakespeare plays Shakespeare (1993), ensuring variability
by randomly selecting the start line for each text message from
the dictionaries. The message dictionaries are provided with each
download from StegoAppDB.
After this extensive coding process, we produce a large num-
ber of innocent images and corresponding stego images, at a va-
riety of embedding rates, from a variety of phone models and de-
vices, using a variety of currently-available mobile stego apps.
The information used to generate each stego image is stored in
data fields in StegoAppDB, including the associated cover image.
Each cover image generated internally from an app is also stored
in StegoAppDB, along with its information. The availability of
this extensive side information for each image provides prove-
nance and clarity about the generation process for each image.
The data collected and populated in StegoAppDB is arranged
in a relational database. The entity relation (ER) diagram is shown
in Fig. 2. This details the relation between cover images, input
images, original images, and stego images, as well as the other
information stored for each type of image.
Descriptive Statistics, Substantiation, and
Evaluation
In this section, we present a quantitative summary of the
data in StegoAppDB. We design experiments and give results that
show how the use of different data in several current steg detec-
tion tools can substantiate strengths or weaknesses of the tool. We
also select some academic machine-learning-based detection al-
gorithms and evaluate their performance using the data from Ste-
goAppDB.
Descriptive Statistics of the Database Contents
The images in StegoAppDB comprise original images,
grayscale PNG images, and stego images and their correspond-
ing cover images. Table 2 displays a summary of camera models
and image data for the 24 devices. Each smartphone device ac-
quired at least 100 indoor scenes of images, where one scene has
20 images.
During photo acquisition, the photographer assigns a scene
one of ten labels, or is unlabeled: books, apple, orange, chair,
stairs, backpack, clock, keyboard, bottle, and keys.Figure 3 shows
the number of labeled and unlabeled original images. Out of the
48240 original images, 10940 have labels.
In Fig. 4, we give a distribution of the number of images
having saturated pixel intensity values. For an original JPEG im-
age, we compute the proportion of intensity values across all three
RBG planes that are below 5 and above 250. Each image falls into
one of the four categories as given in Fig. 4, which shows their
distribution across all original images.
As the exposure settings varied for 18 of the 20 original im-
ages in a scene set, these images cover a wide range of ISO and
exposure time values. Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of
original images at different ranges of exposure settings.
As shown in Table 3, our database contains a total of
810,960, of which 595400 are stego and 119080 are cover. For
each cover image, five stego images are generated at the embed-
ding rates 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.25. Parameters relevant to
the embedding process such as embedding rate, change rate, input
message, password, etc., for each stego image are included in the
csv files downloaded with each set of images.
Commercial or free programs assert capabilities of identi-
fying steganography in some files or work environments. For
example, the embedding algorithm F5 Westfeld (2001) has been
widely used to hide messages in JPEG images, and three software
programs − StegoHuntWetStone Technologies (2017), DC3-
StegoDetectDC3 (2017) and Provos−StegoDetect Provos and
Honeyman (2002) − claim to detect stego images created by the
standard F5 algorithm. To verify this, we randomly select 2000
original JPEG images from our database, implement the standard
F5 algorithm to create 2000 stego images with 10% embedding
rate, and present all 2000 cover-stego pairs to the programs. The
result is provided in Table 4.
As we can see from the Table 4, both Stego Hunt
and DC3−StegDetect have very good performance in detect-
ing the stego images generated by the standard F5, while the
Provos−StegDetect has an unacceptable error rate in our exper-
iment.
However, images generated by stego apps are very different
from the images created by standard academic embedding algo-
rithms. In this case, we use the app PixelKnot as an example,
since it also implements the F5 steganography algorithm with
some minor modifications. Again, we perform a different ran-
dom selection of 2000 cover-stego pairs from our database that
are created by PixelKnot, and present them to the three software
programs. The result is presented in Table 5.
As we can see from the Table 5, all three programs fail to de-
tect the stego images created by PixelKnot. The developers’ code
modification of F5 implemented in their version of PixelKnot in-
cludes an omission of a signature of the F5 algorithm when writ-
ing the stego output images. The signature is found in stego im-
ages output from the standard F5 code. This shows that the rise of
mobile stego apps can bring new challenges to the forensic image
analyst. Indeed, if a digital forensic tool fails in a particular sce-
nario, it can be argued that those results should be used to correct
the tool weakness Beckett and Slay (2007). With our compre-
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Figure 2: The entity-relation (ER) diagram for the database StegoAppDB.
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Figure 3: Percentages of labeled vs. unlabeled images, identified
by operating system.
hensive stego database, we are eager to work with research teams
or companies that have strong interest in this new challenge and
opportunity − detecting stego images from mobile stego apps.
Figure 4: Distribution of saturation of intensity values.
Evaluation of Machine Learning Detection Algo-
rithms
It is well-known that machine learning is a very powerful
tool in detecting stego images created by academic steganography
methods. To show that it is also very effective in detecting stego
images by apps, we design the following experiment.
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Table 2: Database summary: smartphone models, camera specifications, and number of images of different types.
Device Model # Devices ISO Range
Exposure Time
Range
# Scenes
# Original
Images
# Cropped
Images
# Covers # Stegos
Google Pixel 1 4 50 ∼ 3735 1/1258 ∼ 1/7 402 8040 8040 36180 180900
Google Pixel 2 2 50 ∼ 1708 1/9358 ∼ 1/9 201 4020 4020 18090 90450
Samsung Galaxy S8 2 56 ∼ 2097 1/2643 ∼ 1/12 208 4160 4160 18720 93600
One Plus 5 2 100 ∼ 3200 1/2777 ∼ 1/8 201 4020 4020 18090 90450
iPhone 6s 2 25 ∼ 1000 1/60 ∼ 1/3 200 4000 4000 4000 20000
iPhone 6s Plus 2 25 ∼ 1250 1/67 ∼ 1/3 200 4000 4000 4000 20000
iPhone 7 4 20 ∼ 1250 1/67 ∼ 1/3 400 8000 8000 8000 40000
iPhone 7 Plus 2 20 ∼ 1000 1/60 ∼ 1/5 200 4000 4000 4000 20000
iPhone 8 2 20 ∼ 800 1/60 ∼ 1/3 200 4000 4000 4000 20000
iPhone X 2 20 ∼ 800 1/62 ∼ 1/3 200 4000 4000 4000 20000
total 24 20 ∼ 3735 1/9358 ∼ 1/3 2412 48240 48240 119080 595400
total images 810960
Figure 5: Distribution of ISO values of original images.
Figure 6: Distribution of exposure times of original images.
Table 3: Number of cover and stego images by Stego Apps.
Stego App OperatingSystem
# cover
images
# stego
images
PixelKnot Android 20240 101200
Steganography (by Meznik) Android 20240 101200
Pocket Stego Android 20240 101200
MobiStego Android 20240 101200
Passlok Privacy Android 10120 50600
Pictograph iOS 28000 140000
total 119080 595400
Table 4: Error of detection on images generated by standard F5
Error Type Stego Hunt DC3−StegDetect Provos−StegDetect
False Alarm 0% 0% 24.6%
Misdetection 5.2% 0% 47.4%
Avg. Error 2.6% 0% 36.0%
Here, we target classification of stego images created by
four Android apps: PixelKnot, Steganography, Pocket Stego, and
Passlok Privacy. To that end, we select original JPEG images from
four different devices: one Google Pixel 1, one Google Pixel 2,
one Samsung Galaxy S8, and one OnePlus 5, and all correspond-
ing stego images. With embedding rate fixed at 10%, for each
device and each app, we have 1000 cover-stego pairs of images
from the database, in which 500 pairs are used for training, and
the remaining 500 pairs are used for testing.
For the machine learning methods, we implement the CC-
JRM Kodovsky` and Fridrich (2012) for feature extraction on
JPEG images (stego images created by PixelKnot and Passlok)
and SRM Fridrich and Kodovsky (2012) for feature extraction
on PNG images (stego images created Steganography and Pocket
Stego). The FLD ensemble classifier Kodovsky et al. (2012),
which is essentially a random forest method, performs the clas-
sification. The classification accuracy is present in Table 6.
As we can see in Table 6, machine-learning-based detection
algorithms have very impressive performance in detecting stego
images, provided that we know which app create them. However,
we point out that, in the above experiment, we only use JPEG im-
ages as the original source. In the case where RAW images are
used as the original source to generate the stego images, the accu-
racy drops significantly Chen et al. (2018a). Embedding rate can
also affect the detection rate, and in realistic scenarios for small
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Table 5: Error of detection on images generated by PixelKnot
Error Type Stego Hunt DC3−StegDetect Provos−StegDetect
False Alarm 0% 0% 24.6%
Misdetection 100% 100% 75.4%
Avg. Error 50% 50% 50%
Table 6: Classification accuracy of detecting cover-stego pairs by
ML algorithms
Apps Pixel 1 Pixel2 Samsung S8 One Plus 5 Mix of four devices
PixelKnot 97.5% 97.6% 97.6% 98.3% 99.0%
Steganography 98.0% 97.8% 99.4% 97.7% 98.6%
Pocket Stego 96.8% 97.3% 99.5% 98.3% 98.4%
Passlok Privacy 99.0% 97.1% 98.3% 98.3% 98.6%
messages, the effective embedding rate can be less than 3%, mak-
ing detection even harder. In this experiment, only a few machine
learning algorithms are testified. We welcome others to develop
better detection algorithms for stego images from apps and test
using our database.
User Interface to Query for Data
The design of the webpage for public access was created to
facilitate as simple a process as possible for data queries, given
the richness of the data. The database can be accessed through
a link from CSAFE’s webpage Center for Statistics and Appli-
cations in Forensics (2018). On the database’s main webpage,
we give descriptions of the information the user is able to query,
listing the query parameters to search on a wide range of image
characteristics.
There are two main types of data:
• “Original” images, which are the images captured using
Cameraw on mobile devices, with native pixel dimensions
as determined by the camera;
• “Stego” images, which are images embedded with messages
and produced using the stego apps on mobile devices.
Original images or portions thereof may be used for aca-
demic steganalysis algorithms, forgery, or camera identification
problems. Original images can be downloaded and portions
cropped out by the user, or downsized to produce images appro-
priate for academic embedding algorithms. When querying for
stego images, options are available to download other images that
are associated with the stego images, such as cover images or in-
put images. Downloading a cover image that generated the stego
image would be useful in constructing a steganalysis machine
learning classifier where cover images are required for training.
(Recall that some apps downsize the input image prior to embed-
ding, and the downsized image is not available to the app user.)
When a set of images are downloaded, a zip file is provided.
The contents of the zipped file are: folders in which the images
reside, one folder for each type of image (stego, cover, input, and
originals); a csv file for each image type downloaded; a README
text file that describes the search parameters for that particular
search query; and a zip file containing the message dictionaries.
To find “stego” images, a user can query with parameters re-
lated to both the stego images and the corresponding source (orig-
inal) images. There are five filter options for this query:
• Input/Cover Images. A user can choose whether or not
to download the input and cover images associated with the
stego images.
• Stego Program. Select from six different stego apps.
• Embedding Rate. Select from different ranges of embed-
ding rates.
• Source Image Device Model. Select to find stego images
based on the device models from which the corresponding
original images are collected.
• Source Image Exposure Settings. Select to filter stego im-
ages based on the exposure settings of the corresponding
original images.
See Fig. 7 for a picture of the stego search options.
The search for original images is similar to stegos. To find
“original” images, a user can query the database by using the fol-
lowing filters.
• Device Model. Select from any of the 10 device models and
24 devices.
• Image Format. Select from JPEG and JPEG quality, or
DNG.
• Scene Content. Select from 10 indoor scene labels, or select
“unlabeled.”
• Exposure Settings. Select from auto exposure and specific
ranges of ISO and exposure times.
With each image identified in a query, all meta information
and side information are also provided. For original images, this
includes EXIF data, device and label information. For stego im-
ages, in addition to EXIF data, all embedding characteristics in-
cluding stego app, input message, password, etc. are provided.
Conclusion
In this paper, we announce the new database StegoAppDB,
the first data set consisting of hundred of thousands of images
from mobile phones. The database contains images from 24 dif-
ferent devices of 10 different models, and includes stego images
generated by stego apps from the phones. It has a variety of dif-
ferent types of data that make it amenable not only for steganog-
raphy, but for forgery and camera identification. Each image has
a rich set of annotated side information, free from copyright and
privacy issues, and is publicly available.
Other digital image forensic topics may find our database
suitable. Recently it was shown that additional large steganogra-
phy datasets can help solve other digital image forensic including
detection of multiple image manipulations using Convolutional
Neural Networks. Here, learned parameters from a CNN trained
for steganalysis were ”transferred” to a new CNN, the latter of
which was trained successfully on a small amount of data from
a new database to detect median filtering, JPEG compression,
etc. Having more data sets available to the digital image foren-
sics community can be a valuable resource.
We invite the forensic image analysis community to use Ste-
goAppDB and offer suggestions for improvements and future
content.
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